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ABSTRACT




A malicious executable is broadly defined as any program or piece of code designed to
cause damage to a system or the information it contains, or to prevent the system from
being used in a normal manner. A generic term used to describe any kind of malicious
software is Malware, which includes Viruses, Worms, Trojans, Backdoors, Root-kits,
Spyware and Exploits. Anomaly detection is technique which builds a statistical profile
of the normal and malicious data and classifies unseen data based on these two profiles.
A detection system is presented here which is anomaly based and focuses on the
Windows® platform. Several file infection techniques were studied to understand what
particular features in the executable binary are more susceptible to being used for the
malicious code propagation. A framework is presented for collecting data for both static
(non-execution based) as well as dynamic (execution based) analysis of the malicious
executables. Two specific features are extracted using static analysis, Windows API
(from the Import Address Table of the Portable Executable Header) and the hex byte
frequency count (collected using Hexdump utility) which have been explained in detail.
Dynamic analysis features which were extracted are briefly mentioned and the major
challenges faced using this data is explained. Classification results using Support Vector
Machines for anomaly detection is shown for the two static analysis features.
Experimental results have provided classification results with up to 94% accuracy for
new, previously unseen executables.
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The creation and spread of malicious executables is said to have reached pandemic
proportions. According to Sophos [8] all of the top 10 reports of malicious activity were
for the Windows 32 platform, essentially because of the ubiquitous presence of Microsoft
and its related technologies. The top 10 viruses accounted for over 80% of the malicious
activity with W32/Netsky-P alone being responsible for over 22%.
As more people become experienced with the Internet and other networked
applications like Cell phones, Personal Digital Assistants, Embedded Vehicular Sensors,
etc, using these resources would be a part of the daily routine. A malicious code which
manages to reach a vulnerable host among these can inflict varying degrees of damage.
The effect is more severe in a host which is networked as it can lead to cascaded
propagation [11]. The focus of this work has been on the classification of Windows
executables as either normal or malicious using anomaly detection techniques. Only
Windows binaries which have the Potable Executable (PE) format header were
investigated here as they constitute the largest subset of malicious codes. Several file
infection techniques were studied to understand what particular features in the PE format
are more susceptible to being used for the malicious code propagation. Malicious code in
the real world usually has obfuscated code and is also polymorphic in behavior due to the
popularity of tools such as ADMmutate [12]. This leads to constant updates in signature
based detection. Anomaly detection techniques have the advantage that they can be used




The work presented here has used among the largest datasets of both malicious and
normal executables. The training model for the anomaly based detection relies heavily on
the availability of a diversified set of both malicious and normal executables. The
malicious dataset was a total of 2257 MB of data downloaded from the Internet which
included 37,092 distinct files. The normal dataset was collected from a machine running
Windows XP Professional and having about 40 application software installed. All the
executable files from this machine were collected. This was a total of 673 MB which
included about 1,800 files.
Static Analysis is the process of collecting information regarding the binary
without actually executing the same. There are several benefits in using this technique for
data collection. The chances of the environment getting infected during the data
collection process become very remote. This helps in collecting features for a large set of
malicious executables. Also, the feature extraction process can be automated to a large
extent. Dynamic Analysis is a process in which the binary under test is executed and run-
time features such as the registry access, file system access, network access and the
system calls made are collected. The work presented here shows a methodology for data
collection using both Static and Dynamic Analysis. The features extracted from both
these techniques are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
The classification was performed using the freely available Support Vector
Machine tool called `LIBSVM' [10]. While many publications use a small set of features




2.1 Review of Current Research
The industry and research approaches to detecting malicious code have been somewhat
different. While the industry has focused on providing a more deterministic and rule-
based solution, a lot of active research in universities has been in the area of providing an
anomaly based solution. While both have their specific advantages and disadvantages, the
optimal solution lies in a system which can provide both results and then co-relate it at a
higher level.
At Columbia University, Sal Stolfo's group has been doing active and extensive
research in detecting new malicious executables [3] [5] [14]. They have investigated data
mining methods like Naïve Bayes, Multi-Naïve Bayes and RIPPER for the classification.
Cai et al. [7] have evaluated a multivariate Gaussian likelihood model, fit with Principal
Component Analysis and a one-class Support Vector Machine. The have used the byte-
frequency analysis to profile the benign data.
Significant work has also been done for the static analysis of malicious code.
Christodorescu, Jha [2] provide several de-obfuscation techniques and methods to find
the 'semantic equivalence' of an obfuscated and vanilla malicious code. Rabek et al. [1]
at Lincoln Laboratory have used static analysis to identify the virtual addresses of system
calls within the executable and then monitoring the executable at run-time to verify the
location identified earlier. Kruegel et al. [8] have presented a technique which identifies
structural similarities between different worm mutations, evident in most polymorphic
malicious code. Forrest's group at University of New Mexico [15] have done extensive
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work on using system call models to detect a wide range of network and host security
anomalies. C. Zhang, J. Li, C. Manikopoulos et al. [13] have investigated several
statistical anomaly based intrusion detection systems.
Microsoft Research has a group working on the `Strider GhostBuster Rootkit
Detection' project which detects API hiding root-kits by comparing an 'inside-the-box'
infected scan with an 'outside-the-box' clean scan. It detects programs which hide files
and registry entries and assumes that those files are malicious in nature. It also detects
hidden processes by comparing the Win 32 API scan with a direct traversal of the active
process list.
Peter Szor [19] has written a comprehensive book on virus research and defense.
He has given an exhaustive background on the history of computer viruses as well as the
latest trends and developments in advanced code evolution and defense mechanisms.
2.2 Free and Open Source Software
While the industry has focused on providing immediate, scalable and network centric
solutions to the malicious code detection problem and research teams have investigated
and implemented futuristic detection techniques, the FOSS (Free and Open Source
Software) community provides small to medium sized tools to tackle this problem on
freeware basis.
Sysinternals [20] provides several advanced utilities for the Windows internals.
The tool `Process Explorer' provides information such as what files, registry keys, what
DLLs have been loaded by any given running process. The `Rootkit Revealer' scans the
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system to find root-kit based Malware. Another tool AutoRun can be used to find out
programs that are setup for autorun (which usually includes Spyware/Ad-ware).
Microsoft has released a tool in January 2005 called the 'Malicious Software
Removal Tool' and is updated on the second Tuesday of every month. It is used for the
removal of specific Windows based worms and can be run from their website without the
need for installing the same.
`Stinger' is a tool from McAfee to remove specific viruses and worms and is
usually used to clean an infected system, rather than protecting a system in real-time.
Clam AV and AVG Free Edition provide free anti-virus tools to protect systems
and detect malicious codes in real-time. Trend Micro has a tool called 'House Call'
which provides free online web-based scanning for malicious code.
Tools like 'PE Browse' and 'PE Dump' are used for the analysis of Windows (All
or .exe) files. IDA Pro (not freeware) is the industry standard tool for disassembling and
software reverse engineering.
For network related activity, the 'ethereal' tool is used to observe the packets
which are being transmitted or received from the host. `Fport' is used to observe which
are the open ports on the host and which process it belongs to.
CHAPTER 3
FILE INFECTION TECHNIQUES
In this section, several of the virus and malicious code infection strategies that have been
used over the years to invade host system files is explained in brief [19]. An
understanding of these techniques is critical in learning what features to look for in each
of these infection techniques.
3.1 Overwriting Viruses
This is one of the most primitive and simple technique for infecting system files. A
malicious code simply locates a critical file and overwrites it completely with its own
code. One obvious effect of such viruses is that the system cannot perform its basic
functions. Overwriting viruses cannot be disinfected from a system. Infected files must be
deleted from the disk and restored from backups. Some of the common extensions used
by the overwritten files are .vbs, .vbe, .ini, .bat, .com, .hta, etc.
3.2 Random Overwriting Viruses
A rare variation of the overwriting method does not change the code of the program at the
top of the host file. Instead, the virus seeks to a random location in the host program and
overwrites the file with itself at that location. A likely scenario is that the virus code
would not get control during the execution of the host. This kind of malicious code can
evade detection of several virus scanners which look for the signature at a particular
6
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location within the infected file. In most cases, if the host program does not pass control
to the virus code, it would usually result in a system crash.
3.3 Appending Viruses
The technique gets its name from the location of the virus body, which is appended to the
end of the file. Typically, a jump (JMP) or equivalent instruction is inserted at the front of
the host to point to the end of the original host. This technique can be implemented for
other type of executable file, such as EXE, PE, ELF, etc. These files have a header
section that stores the address of the main entry point, which, in most cases, is replaced
with a new entry point to point to the virus code appended to the end of the file.
3.4 Prepending Viruses
This technique uses the principle of inserting the virus code at the start of the host
programs. An example of this kind of a virus is Polimer.512.A, which prepends itself,
512 bytes long, at the front of the executable and shifts the original content to follow
itself. Depending on the actual structure of the executable, the execution of the original
program is not a trivial task. The infection involves creation of a new temporary file to
hold the content of the original host program. The system () call is used to execute the
original program in the temporary file. The malicious code typically passes command-
line parameters of the infected host to the host program stored in the temporary file. This
ensures that the functionality of the host program does not break because of the missing
parameters.
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3.5 Classic Parasitic Viruses
This is a variation of the prepender technique. Often when such malicious codes are
repaired, the repair definition directs to copy N number of bytes to the front of the file by
calculating backward from the end of the infected program. Then the file is truncated at
FILESIZE — N, where N is typically the size of the virus. The most common reason for
this type of repair to fail is that the file can have multiple infections. Early anti-virus
programs used to append some extra data, such as inoculation information to mark files
which have been cleaned. This caused problems when the inoculated files got infected
with another parasitic virus. The FILESIZE-N calculation will seek to an incorrect
location and cause the program to crash. Some viruses made use of this particular
anomaly in the anti-virus tools to crash system files.
3.6 Cavity Viruses
These malicious codes typically do not increase the size of the object they infect. Instead
they overwrite a part of the file that can be used to store the virus code safely. Cavity
infectors typically overwrite areas of files that contain zeros in binary files. However,
other areas also can be overwritten, such as OxCC filled blocks that C compilers often use
for instruction alignment. Other viruses overwrite areas that contain spaces (0x20).
A special kind of cavity infection relies on PE programs relocation sections.
Relocations of most executables are not used in normal situations. Modern linker
versions can be configured to compile PE executables without a relocation table.
Relocation cavity viruses overwrite this section when it exists. W32/CTX and
W95/Vulcano virus families use this technique.
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3.7 Fractionated Cavity Viruses
Not many Win32 viruses implement the cavity infection technique successfully. The
W95/CIH implements a variation of this technique called the fractionated cavity
technique. In this case, the virus code is split between a loader routine and N number of
sections that contain section slack space. First the loader (HEAD) routine of the virus
locates the snippets of the virus code and reads them into continuous area of memory,
using an offset tablet kept in the HEAD part of the virus code. During the infection, the
virus locates the section slack gaps of PE files and injects its code into as many section
slack holes as necessary.
A new viral entry point will be presented in the header of the file to point to the
start of the virus code, usually inside the header section of the host applications.
Eventually, the virus executes the original host program from the stored entry point (EP).
The exact identification of such viruses is complicated because the virus snippets need to
be pieced together.
Figure 3.1 A fractured cavity virus.
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3.8 Compressing Viruses
This technique uses the approach of compressing the content of the host program.
Sometimes this technique is used to hide the host program's size increase after the
infection by packing the host program sufficiently with a binary packing algorithm.
Runtime binary packers, such as PKLITE, LZEXE, ASPACK, etc are extremely popular
programs used by attackers to pack the content of Trojan horses, viruses, worms, etc. to
make them obfuscated and shorter. W32/HybrisF used this technique. Another infamous
example is W32/Aldebera which combines the infection method with polymorphism.
Aldebera attempted to compress the host in such as way that it remained equivalent in
size to the original file.
3.9 Amoeba Infection Technique
This is a more rarely seen infection technique which embeds the host program inside the
virus body. This is done by Prepending the head part of the virus to the front of the file
and appending the tail part to the very end of the host file. The head has access to the tail
and is loaded later. W32/Sand.12300 is an example of this technique.
3.10 Embedded Decryptor Technique
Some crafty viruses inject their decryptors into the executable's code. The entry point of
the host is modified to point to the decryptor code. The location of the decryptor is
randomly selected, and the decryptor is split into many parts. The overwritten blocks are
stored inside the virus code for proper execution of the host program after infection.
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When the infected application starts, the decryptor is executed. The decryptor of the virus
decrypts the encrypted body and gives it control.
The easiest way to analyze such virus code is based on the use of special decoy
files filled with a constant pattern, such as 0x41 (`A') characters. After the test infection,
the overwritten parts stand out in the infected test program. Several anti virus tools put
together the pieces of the decryptor by following these offsets to decrypt the virus.
3.11 Embedded Decryptor and Virus Body Technique
A more sophisticated approach was used by the Bulgarian virus, Commander_ Bomber,
written by Dark Avenger. The virus body is split into several parts, which are placed at
random positions on the host program. The overwritten parts are stored at the end of the
file, and a table is used to describe their locations.
The control blocks are polymorphic, generated by the DAME (Dark Avenger
Mutation Engine) of the virus. This makes the blocks difficult to read because they
contain a lot of garbage code with obfuscated ways to give control to the next block, until
the non-encrypted virus body is reached. Back in 1993 this technique was very
sophisticated and most of the anti virus tools missed detecting this. The host program is
reconstructed by the virus in run-time.
3.12 Obfuscated Tricky Jump Technique
W32/Donut was the first virus to infect .NET executables. Donut gets control
immediately upon executing an infected .NET PE file. The virus uses the simplest
possible infection technique to infect .NET images. In fact, Donut turns .NET executables
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to regular looking PE files (.NET uses Just-In-Time compilation). This is because the
virus nullifies the data directory entry of the CLR header when it infects a .NET
application.
The six-byte long jump to the _CoreExeMain() import at the entry point of .NET
files is replaced by Donut with a jump to the virus entry point. The _CoreExeMain()
function is used to fire up the CLR execution of the MSIL (Microsoft Intermediate
Language) code. The entry point in the header is not changed. This technique is called an
obfuscated tricky jump. Evidently, this method fooled some heuristic scanners.
The actual jump at the entry point will be replaced with a OxE9 (JMP) opcode,
followed by an offset to the start of the virus body in the first physical byte of the
relocation section.
3.13 Entry-Point Obscuring (EPO) Viruses
Entry-point obscuring viruses do not change the entry point of the application to infect it;
neither do they change the code at the entry point. Instead, they change the program code
somewhere in such a way that the virus code gets control randomly during the execution
of the host program.
3.13.1 Basic EPO Techniques on DOS
Several viruses use the EPO strategy on DOS to avoid easy detection with fast scanners
that scan the file near its entry-point code. The Olivia virus from early 1997 infected
DOS EXE and COM files using this method.
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If the victim has a COM extension, Olivia uses a special function that reads four
bytes in a loop from the beginning and checks for OxE9 (JMP), OxEB (JMP short), 0x90
(NOP), OxF8 (CLC), OxF9 (STC), OxFA (CLI), OxFB (STI), OxFC (CLD) and OxFD
(STD) each time. If one of the previous instructions is found, the virus seeks the place of
the next such instruction. If that position is not in the last 64 bytes of the host, the virus
modifies the host program at the location where the previous instruction sequence was
detected.
Olivia uses the 0x68 (Intel PUSH) opcode to push a word value to the stack. This
is followed by a OxC3 (RET) instruction, which gives control to the virus code by
popping the pushed offset to the decryptor of the virus.
3.13.2 Advanced EPO Techniques on DOS
The Nexiv_Der virus is polymorphic in COM files, and it also infects disk's boot sector
(DBS). The most interesting technique of this virus, however, is the special EPO
technique that it uses to infect files.
This virus traces the execution of a program as an application debugger does.
Then it patches the code at a randomly selected location to a CALL instruction. This
CALL instruction points to the polymorphic decryptor of the virus.
The execution path through a program depends on many parameters, including the
command-line arguments passed to the program and DOS version number. Depending on
the same parameters, an infected victim program will most likely run the virus code upon
normal execution each time. However, the virus might not run at all on a different version
of DOS because the virus code cannot take control. This generates a major problem for
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even sophisticated heuristic scanners that use a virtual machine to simulate the execution
of programs because it is difficult to emulate all of the system calls and the execution
path of the victim.
3.13.3 EPO Viruses on 16-Bit Windows
One of the first EPO viruses in the wild was the Tentacle_II family on Windows 3.x
systems. Tentacle_II takes advantage of the module reference table of NE files to find
common function calls that are expected to be executed among the first function calls
made by the host programs. Examples of these initialization functions are relocation
record 91 (INITTASK) in the case of KERNEL or 100 (THUNKMAIN) in the case of
VBRUN300.
3.13.4 API Hooking Technique on Win32
On Win32 systems, EPO techniques are highly advanced. The PE file format can be
attacked in different ways. One of the most common EPO techniques is based on the
hooks of an instruction pattern in the program's code section. A typical Win32
application makes a lot of calls to APIs. Many Win32 EPO viruses take advantage of API
CALL points and change these pointers to their own start code. Viruses typically search
for one or both API call implementations:
• Microsoft API Implementation
CALL DWORD PTR[]
• Borland API Implementation
JMP D WORD PTR[]
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Viruses can hook an API that is called whenever the application exits back to the
system. In this case, most programs call the ExitProcess() API. By replacing the call to
ExitProcess() with the call to the virus body, a virus can trigger its infection routine more
reliably whenever the application exits. To make antivirus detection more difficult,
viruses often combine EPO techniques with code obfuscation techniques, such as
encryption or polymorphism.
3.13.5 Function Call Hooking on Win32
Another common technique of EPO viruses is to locate a function call reliable in the
application's code section to a subroutine of the program. Because the pattern of a CALL
instruction could be part of another instruction's data, the virus would not be able to
identify the instruction boundaries properly by looking for CALL instruction alone.
To solve this problem, viruses often check to see whether the CALL instruction
points to a pattern that appears to be the start of a typical subroutine call. The function
calls usually start with the 0x55 Ox8B OxEC sequence. Another similar opcode sequence
is 0x55 0x89 OxE5. This technique was used by the variants of W32/RainSong.
3.13.6 Import Table Replacing on Win32
Newer Win32 viruses infect Win32 executables in such as way that they do not need to
modify the original code of the program to take control. Instead, such EPOs works
somewhat similar to the 16-bit Windows virus Tentacle II.
To get control, the virus simple changes the import address table entries of the PE
host in such a way that each API call of the application via the import address directory
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will run the virus code instead. In turn, the activated virus code presents a new import
table in the memory image of the program. As a result, consequential API CALLs run
proper, original entry-point code via the fixed import table. This technique is used by the
W32/Idele family of viruses.
Figure 3.2 Import Address Table replacing EPO virus.
3.13.7 Instruction Tracing Technique on Win32
The Nexiv_Der virus inspired modern virus writing on 32-bit Windows systems. In 2003,
new viruses started to appear that use EPO, based on the technique that was pioneered on
DOS. For example, the W32/Perenast family of viruses is capable of tracing host
programs before infection by running the host as a hidden debug process using standard
Windows debug APIs.
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3.13.8 Use of "Unknown" Entry Points
Another technique to execute virus code in a semi-EPO manner involves code execution
via non-well known entry points of applications. The Win32 PE file format is commonly
known to execute applications from the MAIN entry point stored in the
PE.OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint field of the executable's header structure.
Interestingly, this is not necessarily the first entry point in a PE file that the
system loader executes. On Windows NT systems and above, the system loader looks for
the thread local storage (TLS) data directory in the PE files header first. If it finds the
TLS entry points, it executes these first. Only after that will it run the MAIN entry-point
code. This technique is largely undocumented and was only recently successfully used
by the W32/Chiton viruses in 2003.
3.13.9 Code Integration Based EPO Viruses
A very sophisticated virus infection technique is called code integration. A virus using
this technique inserts its own code into the execution flow of the host program using
standard EPO technique and merges its code with the host program's code. This is a
complicated technique which requires complete disassembling and reassembling of the
host. The W95/Zmist virus used this approach. This technique is a major challenge for
detection. The virus is camouflaged in the code section of the infected host program, and
it is very difficult to locate the instruction that transfers control to the start of the virus.
18
3.14 Possible Future Infection Techniques
A technique known as Code Builders has not yet been seen in viruses but is deemed
plausible. The virus code flows into the host programs code and back. In such viruses the
intent is to build the entire virus body on the fly, using the content of the host program.
The idea is based on the fact that any program might contain another set of programs in it
as instructions or instruction sequences. The viruses are advanced versions of the poly




The goal of this thesis was to explore which static features from an executable provide
better classification results. A large set of executables was collected from commonly
available sources. The dataset was further spilt into a training set and test set. Section 4.2
elaborates on the dataset being used.
The next step was to extract features to be used with the classifiers. The feature
extraction requires certain amount of domain expertise to identify which features would
be more useful than others. This reduces the load of statistical feature reduction. In
Chapter 4 the various feature extraction techniques that were used, have been explained
in detail. The final step is to feed this data to a classification tool. In Chapter 5 the use of
Support Vector Machines (SVM) for this has been explained. The entire framework for
this system is as shown in the figure below.
Figure 4.1 Malicious Code Detection methodology using SVM.
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4.2 Taxonomy of Malicious Binaries
A comprehensive and well classified data set of 'Malicious Code' was integral to this
study of analyzing and detecting malicious windows binaries. We were greatly aided by
the availability of such data on the Internet. Several categories of Malicious Code, as
elaborated in Table 4.1 were collected from a mirror website of VX Heavens. The wget
utility was used to download the entire dataset. Each malicious file was received in a
compressed format and hence a command-line recursive utility was used to unzip and
store these files. The files available were named in the following manner:
TopLevelCategory.SubCategory.MaliciousCodeName.Variant
The Top level category describes the type of the malicious code and is useful in
determining the intended effect of the malicious code. For example Email-flooder would
send out large number of emails, a Backdoor would most likely provide a secret open-
port or an access authentication which only the attacker is aware of. The Sub-Category is
the target program or platform which the malicious code is attacking or exploiting. Table
4.1 gives the list of Top-level and Sub-level categories of the malicious code being used.
The malicious code name is what that program is most popularly known as on the
internet. The 'Variant' (e.g., BACKDOOR.WIN32.DARKFTP.14) is usually a small
modification to the original malicious code and is represented with either a number or the
alphabet depending on the number of variants available.
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The taxonomy is very useful when working with large sets of malicious codes.
For anomaly detection, multiple training models can be created for each of the top-level
malicious code categories. This helps in creating a better profile of the malicious code
and can also help in the categorization of the test data and the subsequent remedial action.
The sub-level category is useful to identify the technique which needs to be used for the
feature extraction. The header and the entire file format of the malicious code could be
different for the different sub-level categories. For E.g. a Win32 executable is different
from a Linux or Solaris executable. We have focused here only on the Win32 Portable
Executable format of malicious codes. A comparison graph shows the distribution of the
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malicious codes based on their file types. While the DOS malicious codes are the highest,
they have been steadily on the decline and the number of Win32 malicious codes has
risen sharply in the recent years. This was one of the reasons for focusing exclusively on
the Win32 file types in this study.




The feature extraction for static analysis utilizes information from within the structure of
the executable and hence, the file does not need to be executed. While the semantics of
the data collected remains the same for several different platforms, the actual structure of
the file varies as it depends on the operating system that the executable has been
compiled for. The work presented here is focused on the Windows 32 executables which
use the Portable Executable (PE) file format.
5.1.1 Portable Executable File Format
The feature extraction performed here is directly on the Portable Executable (PE) format
Windows binaries. As discussed in [16] the structure of PE was introduced by Microsoft
with the intent to have a common file format for all versions of Windows on all CPU's.
PE files are derived from the earlier Common Object File Format (COFF). Any given
compiler, creating an executable for the Windows platform, produces an OBJ file which
is in the COFF format. For the new 64-bit Windows, there have been few modifications
to the PE format and it is now called PE32+. The overview of the PE file structure is as
shown in Figure 5.1
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Figure 5.1 Overview of PE file format.
When the executable invokes a function from another DLL, it is importing it. The
loader takes care of locating the imported functions and making those addresses available
to the file being loaded. The LoadLibrary or GetProcAddress API's are used to
perform this function. The imports data is in the IMAGE IMPORTS DESCRIPTOR
data structure. There is one IMAGE IMPORTS DESCRIPTOR for each DLL invoked.
The end of the descriptor is indicated by an entry with all fields set to 0. Each descriptor
typically points to two essentially identical arrays. These are commonly known as Import
Address Table (TAT) or Import Name Table (TNT). Figure 4.2 shows an executable
importing some API's from USER32.DLL
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Figure 5.2 API import from USER32.DLL.
The information that is of interest with regards to the static analysis is the API
invoked with the DLL. For individual file processing several PE Browsing tools are
available, as well as obj dump which is a tool available with Cygwin. For batch
processing purposes of the large data set, a freeware utility called UsesWhat [17] was
used. UsesWhat is a DLL/API scan utility which scans the import tables of PE files and
provides comma-delimited files. Figure 5.3 shows the DLL/API features collected. The
comma-delimited file is the raw data input to the pre-processing step. As a first step in
the pre-processing, a master list of the all. APIs used in the training data is collected in a
single text file and a unique numerical value is given to each of these APIs. The
subsequent processing involves creating a feature vector for each given file, in which a
list of the APIs invoked by that particular file is listed. This feature vector is the input to
the anomaly detection algorithm.
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Figure 5.3 DLL/API features.
To create a visual representation of the data which was collected, a frequency plot
was done as shown in Figure 5.4. The graph plots the number of functions called within
each DLL against the various DLLs which exist in Windows (330 DLLs were used in this
test).
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Malicious Data Set 	 Normal Data Set
Figure 5.4 Frequency plot for DLL information.
5.1.2 Hex Dump
Traditionally, a Hex Dump is used to describe an unstructured record of the contents of
the working memory, and is generally used to debug a program that has terminated
abnormally (crashed). It is also referred to as a crash dump or a core dump. In this
context the hex dump is the contents of an executable file in the hexadecimal format.
Most variants of the UNIX system have a utility called the hexdump or obj dump to
produce the hexadecimal output. On the Windows platform freeware third-party utilities
[18] are available to produce the Hexdump output. Figure 5.5 shows the output of this
tool.
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Figure 5.5 Hex Dump output.
A batch script was written to collect the Hexdump data for the entire malicious and
normal data set.
The pre-processing of this data was done using a Perl script which counted the
occurrence of each of the hex patterns in the data. A total of 255 patterns [00 — FF] are
possible. A feature vector was created for each of the training and test file in a
name:value pair where the name of the feature was each of the 255 patterns and the value
is the count of that pattern in the given file.
5.2 Dynamic Analysis
In contrast to the static analysis, dynamic analysis involves the actual execution of the
file and data is collected during the execution phase of the file. This technique has certain
advantages over the static analysis, such as the availability of the de-obfuscated data,
real-time execution sequence data, the actual operating system call parameters, etc. In
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one of the major drawbacks of this technique is that only one of the many possible
execution traces can be collected and it is up to the data collection process to determine
which the best execution scenario to use is. The data collected here consists of:
• System call data
• Registry access data
• File system access data
• Network access data
5.2.1 Trapping System Calls
A system call is a software interrupt used by an application program to request service
from the operating system. System calls often use a special machine code instruction
which causes the processor to change mode (e.g. to 'protected mode'). As with the
Hexdump utility, a tool is available on the UNIX systems called `strace' which is used to
print out all the trace of system calls made by another process/program. A Windows port
of this tool is available with the Cygwin package.
On the Windows platform, applications interact with the operating system using
`Windows API'. The strace program captures the sequence of Windows API calls made
by any given application. For this, the application does not need to be compiled again,
nor is the source code of the application needed.
For anomaly based malicious code detection, the sequence information provided
by this tool is very useful. Techniques such as n-gram analysis and a state-based Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) can be used to build a model of the typical normal and malicious
executables.
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5.2.2 Registry Access Data
The Windows Registry is a database which stores settings and options for the Microsoft
Windows 32-bit version operating system. It contains information and settings for all the
hardware, software, users and preferences of the PC. The Registry is split into logical
sections, as follows:
• HKEY CLASSES ROOT (HKCR)
• HKEY CURRENT USER (HKCU)
• HKEY LOCAL MACHINE (HKLM)
• HKEY USER
 • HKEY CURRENT CONFIG
User modification of the Registry is done using the regedit.exe tool. For the application
programs to read, write or edit the Registry, special Windows API are provided. The
RegMon utility provided by Sysinternals [20] shows which applications are accessing the
Registry, which are the keys being accessed and the Registry data that is being read and
written to. Figure below shows the screen shot of the tool being used to capture data in
real-time.
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Figure 5.6 RegMon utility capturing data.
5.2.3 File System Access Data
Formally, a file system is a set of abstract data types that are implemented for the storage,
hierarchical organization, manipulation, navigation, access and retrieval of data on a disk.
File systems typically have directories which associate file names with files, usually by
connecting a name to an index in the file allocation table, such as the FAT in MS-DOS or
the mode in a UNIX-based file system.
The file system calls made by the application program can be captured in real-
time using freeware utilities such as TileMon'. The utility provides sequential
information regarding the actual file system call, the path to the file, the result and the
timestamp of the call. Figure below shows a screen shot of the FileMon tool.
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Figure 5.7 FileMon utility capturing data.
The sequential information is captured for each application program based on the
process-id. An automated batch processing implementation of this tool was attempted as
a part of this thesis using the Microsoft 'Installable File System Development Kit' for
Windows. Using the `minispy', a program was written which based on a particular
process-id would capture all the file system calls being made and if the process name/id
tried to access certain files which were supposed to be beyond its scope, the file system
call would have been blocked. Significant progress was made with regards to the
automated technique for capturing file system calls. The blocking of system calls raised
some interesting problems, as this tool needed to automatically know that a new process
has begun execution and that it should start capturing data. The process monitoring and
related issues were found to be beyond the scope of this thesis work.
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5.2.4 Network Access Data
While all the data collected in the prior three sections has been local to the host where the
malicious code is executing, most malicious activity propagates using the network
services and the open ports on vulnerable hosts. Monitoring the network access for data
being transmitted and received can be valuable for the malicious code detection. Several
tools are available for sniffing traffic over the Ethernet. In this a machine is put in the
promiscuous mode and a sniffer program such as ethereal is used to see the packets
which are being transferred. A tool from Sysinternals is available called TDIMon
(Transport Driver Interface Monitor) which provides TCP and UDP based activity by the
application on the local system.
The data provided is directly related to the WinSock (Windows Socket API)
functions. The Figure below shows the screen shot of the data captured by this tool.
Figure 5.8 TDIMon utility capturing data.
CHAPTER 6
SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE BASED ANOMALY DETECTION
Support Vector Machines (SVM) was invented by Vladimir Vapnik. They are a method
for creating functions from a set of labeled training data. The function can be a
classification function (binary output based on the category of the input) or a general
regression function. For the anomaly detection we have used the classification output of
the SVM.
6.1 SVM Overview
Support Vector Machines are based on the concept of decision planes that define decision
boundaries. A decision plane is one that separates between a set of objects having
different class memberships. A schematic example is shown in Figure 6.1. [21] In this
example, the objects belong either to class WHITE or BLACK. The separating line
defines a boundary on the right side of which all objects are BLACK and to the left of
which all objects are WHITE. Any new object falling to the right is labeled, i.e.,
classified, as BLACK (or classified as WHITE should it fall to the left of the line).
Figure 6.1 Linear classification
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A curved line could be needed to classify data which is more complex. Figure 6.2
shows the basic idea behind Support Vector Machines. Here the original objects (left side
of the figure) are mapped, i.e., rearranged, using a set of mathematical functions, known
as kernels. The process of rearranging the objects is known as mapping (transformation).
Note that in this new setting, the mapped objects (right side of the figure) is linearly
separable and, thus, instead of constructing the complex curve (left figure), all we have to
do is to find an optimal line that can separate the WHITE and the BLACK. objects.
Figure 6.2 Support Vector Machine based classification
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is primarily a classier method that performs
classification tasks by constructing hyperplanes in a multidimensional space that
separates cases of different class labels. To construct an optimal hyperplane, SVM
employs an iterative training algorithm which is used to minimize an error function.
According to the form of the error function, SVM models can be classified into four
distinct groups:
• Classification SVM Type 1 (also known as C-SVM classification or C-SVC)
• Classification SVM Type 2 (also known as nu-SVM classification or nu-SVC)
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• Regression SVM Type 1 (also known as epsilon-SVM regression)
• Regression SVM Type 2 (also known as nu-SVM regression)
For the C-SVC, the parameter 'C' is known as the cost factor and it can be varied
during the training phase.
6.2 SVM Data Representation
LIBSVM uses a BNF-like format for the data.
Figure 6.3 SVM data format.
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6.3 SVM Analysis on DLL/API Data
For the SVM analysis on the DLL/API data, as a part of the pre-processing step an API
list is created in which each of the APIs is given a unique id. This id is used to create the
feature vector. A label is also provided to each of these feature vectors where +1 denotes
that the record is normal and -1 denotes that the record is malicious. The entire vector
with the label is used as the input to the SVM to build the training model.
Table 6.1 DLL/API Training and Test Datasets for SVM
Training Data Test Data
Normal 276 58
Malicious 1148 133
The svmt ra in tool was used to build the training model. The default SVM
type was used, which is C-SVC. Different cost factors were used with this training
model. The results are shown as follows.
Table 6.2 Effect of Cost Factor 'c' on SVM Training for DLL/API Data
Cost Factor 'c' of C-SVC Classification Results
Test 1 1 [default] 89.52% [171/191]
Test 2 5 93.19% [178/191]
Test 3 100 96.33% [184/191]
Test 4 1000 97.90% [187/191]
The classification results are obtained using the svmpredict tool. As can be
seen, with a higher cost factor, the classification results improve.
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6.4 SVM Analysis on Hex Dump Data
In Hex Dump data, the feature vector consisted of the label (+1/-1) followed by the hex
patterns [00 — FF] in decimal and the count of each of those patterns in the given file.
Due to the nature of the data, the count of these patters varied significantly. Hence,
scaling was done prior to building the training model. The SVM tool svms cal e was
used to scale the data in the -1 to +1 range. Table 6.3 gives the details regarding the size
of the training and testing data sets.
Table 6.3 Hex Dump Training and Test Datasets for SVM
Training Data Test Data
Normal 1477 155
Malicious 2074 582
The gamma factor 'g' of the SVM was varied in this case. The gamma factor can take
values from 1/k to 0.9, where k is the number of features of the vector (in this case
k=256).
Table 6.4 Effect of Gamma Factor 'g' on SVM Training of Hex Dump Data
Gamma factor 'g' classification results
Test 1 1/256 [default] 79.91 %
Test 2 0.1 82.08 %
Test 3 0.3 82.76 %
Test 4 0.6 88.46 %
Test 5 0.9 89.96 %
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Malicious Code Detection is a constantly evolving field. Several malicious code writers
are sophisticated programmers with some of the latest tools available at their disposal.
But, as with buffer overflows which have usually used NOP equivalent machine codes
and a return address to exploit, the underlying structure of these malicious codes has also
followed a similar pattern over the years. Hence, while signature based detection will
need constant updates, the need for anomaly based detection to supplement these
methods will only grow.
The feature extraction done in this thesis work uses some of the more generic data
which any malicious code cannot avoid to contain. This technique also has a significant
advantage of automated data collection and a relatively safe way of processing malicious
codes, which would not result in the compromise of the data collection environment. This
makes the technique more realistic to be implemented in a live scenario. The SVM




Initial feature extraction techniques and classification results have been presented here. In
the PE header data, presently only the information regarding which APIs have been
called is being used. A more sophisticated approach could also find out the API call
sequence. This kind of sequence based data could be very useful in using state-transition
based classification. Also, additional data regarding the API can be collected such as the
Virtual Memory Address (VMA) of each of these function calls. This information could
be very useful during the run-time monitoring of an executable. Any deviation from the
pre-determined VMAs could mean malicious behavior. More research needs to be done
to know what the behavior of this feature is in both the normal and malicious executables.
Statistical probability of the feature can also be computed and used as an input to the
classifier.
Several classification techniques also exist besides Support Vector Machines. The
use of Bayesian Networks, Hidden Markov Models and other n-gram based analysis has
proven to be quite effective on similar data. Data mining algorithms can also be used to
make the anomaly detection. Future work also includes the comparison of these various
techniques on the features extracted. An n x m table of such an experiment would let us
know which features and classification technique gives the best result. A feedback
mechanism can also be implemented for the training model which is built for the anomaly
detection. For every correctly classified malicious or normal file, the training model
would be updated. Co-relation of the results of various techniques could also enhance the












SAMPLE SVM RESULTS WITH PROBABILITY ESTIMATES
Support Vector Machines output is given here with probability estimates. The output also
includes the actual values from the test data, misclassification rates and false positives
and false negatives.
Accuracy: 86.43% (637/737)
False Positives: 4.74% (35/737)
False Negatives: 8.81% (65/737)
Misclassified Malicious: 11.16% (65/582)
Misclassified Normal: 22.50% (35/155)
Actual Value	 Probability Estimates	 Predicted Value
-1/+1
-1 0.867998 0.132002 -1
-1 0.909216 0.0907838 -1
-1 0.796379 0.203621 -1
-1 0.852271 0.147729 -1
-1 0.881023 0.118977 -1
-1 0.890868 0.109132 -1
-1 0.894294 0.105706 -1
-1 0.94084 0.0591604 -1
-1 0.999137 0.000862609 -1
-1 0.96909 0.0309099 -1
-1 0.991446 0.0085538 -1
-1 0.867645 0.132355 -1
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